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A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO 
DEFAMATION CLAIMS IN NEW 
ZEALAND: UNTANGLING THE HARM 
THRESHOLD 
Emma Croskery* 
The threshold requirement of reputational harm for bringing a defamation claim needs clarification. 
Although recent case law shows that a threshold exists, precedents conflict as to what exactly the 
threshold requires, and who bears the burden of proof. There is further judicial disagreement on 
whether the principle that defamation claims can be struck out if no real and substantial tort has been 
committed, the Jameel principle, applies in New Zealand. This article suggests that both the harm 
threshold (more accurately described as a ''tendency to cause harm'' threshold, as it does not require 
proof of actual harm) and the Jameel principle have a valuable place in New Zealand's defamation 
law and their application requires endorsement and clarification at appellate level. Further, this 
article highlights that the principles are conceptually distinct and their fusion is undesirable in New 
Zealand. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Issues in defamation law often centre on the same essential question: how should the balance be 
struck between the defendant's right to freedom of expression and the claimant's right to protection of 
reputation? This question is at the forefront of debates regarding whether a claimant must have 
suffered reputational harm to have an actionable defamation claim. Prior to the passage of the 
Defamation Act 2013, the United Kingdom courts developed two methods of jettisoning claims 
brought by plaintiffs who suffered minimal harm. The first was a harm threshold, which rather than 
requiring proof of actual harm, required that the publication have a tendency to cause reputational 
harm. The threshold has received support in recent New Zealand judgments but has been interpreted 
inconsistently, with judges disagreeing on what level the threshold is pitched at1 and which party 
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1  It is unclear whether the threshold requires that the publication has a tendency to cause serious harm: see CPA 
Australia Ltd v New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants [2015] NZHC 1854 at [120]; substantial 
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bears the burden of proof.2 The second method allows the court to strike out prima facie actionable 
claims as an abuse of process where no real and substantial tort has been committed. The strike out is 
predicated on the harm caused being so minor that the time and expense necessitated by continued 
litigation would be disproportionate to any vindication the claimant could achieve. Because this 
jurisdiction is only engaged where harm to reputation is minimal,3 there is significant overlap between 
the two theories, although their conceptual grounding is distinct. 
Using this "twin track" approach, a claim could fail either because:  
(1) the publication does not satisfy the threshold requirement that the meaning of the words have 
a tendency to cause reputational harm (the Thornton principle); or 
(2) of a successful strike out application on the basis that continuing the claim would be a 
disproportionate drain on judicial resources because no real and substantial tort has been 
committed (the Jameel principle).  
Track one only looks at the meaning of the words published, and deals with claims which are not 
actionable because the meaning of the publication does not meet the required standard of seriousness 
to be defamatory. Conversely, track two responds to prima facie actionable claims, the pursuit of 
which would be a disproportionate drain on court resources due to external evidence which proves 
the lack of a real and substantial tort.  
This article argues for endorsement of both tracks in New Zealand. Part II explains why a bar to 
trivial claims is necessary. New Zealand's statutory context is set out in Part III. The United Kingdom 
position is examined in Part IV, including a discussion of the twin track approach which operated 
prior to the Defamation Act 2013 (UK). Part V analyses New Zealand's case law (in particular, how 
it has responded to United Kingdom developments) and concludes that although support for both 
tracks is present in New Zealand, clarification is required before the twin track approach can function 
effectively in this jurisdiction. Conflicting precedents at High Court level mean that appellate 
consideration of the issue is required. Both tracks should be endorsed and their precise scope needs 
to be defined.  
Against this background, Part VI recommends that the New Zealand courts should adopt the twin 
track approach rather than fuse the tracks, as has recently occurred in the United Kingdom.4 The 
  
harm: see Opai v Culpan (No 2) [2016] NZHC 3004 at [32]; or if more than minor harm will suffice: see 
Sellman v Slater [2017] NZHC 2392, [2018] 2 NZLR 218 at [68]. 
2  Palmer J in Sellman v Slater, above n 1, placed the burden on the defendant. All other judges have placed the 
burden on the claimant. 
3  Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75, [2005] QB 946 at [40]. 
4  Although as will be addressed in Part IV(D), following the Court of Appeal judgment in Lachaux v 
Independent Print Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1334, [2018] 2 WLR 387 [Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (CA)] 
this position is far from settled. 
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tracks are conceptually distinct and incorporating aspects of the Jameel principle into the Thornton 
threshold eradicates the presumption of harm, which places an unreasonable burden on claimants. The 
existence of two distinct routes for disposing of unworthy claims can ensure that most trivial or 
disproportionate claims are able to be struck out without excessively burdening claimants and without 
a need for statutory intervention. This approach is workable and conceptually sound, and strikes an 
appropriate balance between the defendant's right to freedom of expression and the claimant's right to 
reputation. 
II THE NEED FOR A BAR TO TRIVIAL CLAIMS 
The growing appetite for restricting defamation claims largely results from three factors. Firstly, 
defamation trials, which are notoriously drawn-out and technical, impose a hefty financial burden on 
the parties and the courts.5 Growing concern about the consumption of finite court resources has 
fostered judicial desire to dispose of trivial proceedings at an early stage.6 Expending judicial 
resources on trivial defamation trials wastes public money7 and slows down access to the courts, 
hindering the administration of justice.8 Secondly, a defamation lawsuit, even one which ultimately 
fails, is a direct interference with the defendant's right to freedom of expression, a right which society 
is increasingly protective of.9 A third (and related) factor is the perception of the tort as excessively 
"plaintiff friendly".10 This perception is not baseless; the plaintiff to a defamation claim bears no 
burden of proving that the imputations complained of are false,11 nor do they need to provide evidence 
of harm.12 
The context in which issues of triviality arise is best highlighted through a few examples. In 
Ecclestone v Telegraph Media Group Ltd a young socialite and model, soon to launch her own fashion 
label, was misquoted by The Telegraph as saying she did not "have much time for" prominent 
vegetarians Annie Lennox and the McCartney family, implying (arguably at least) that she was 
dismissive of vegetarians.13 The Telegraph was sued again the following year in Thornton v 
  
5  Opai v Culpan [2017] NZHC 1036, [2017] NZAR 1142 at [81]. 
6  X v Attorney-General of New Zealand (No 2) [2017] NZHC 1136, [2017] NZAR 1365 at [19]. 
7  Sellman v Slater, above n 1, at [59]; and Moodie v Strachan [2013] NZHC 1394 at [59].  
8  Opai v Culpan, above n 5, at [63]; and Deliu v Hong [2013] NZHC 735 at [159]. 
9  Opai v Culpan, above n 5, at [89]. 
10  Ali Romanos "Is New Zealand the Libel World's most plaintiff friendly jurisdiction?" (25 August 2015) 
Inforrm's Blog <https://inforrm.org>; and Ware v Johnson [2014] NZHC 892 at [46]. 
11  Defamation Act 1992, s 8. 
12  Rosemary Tobin and David Harvey New Zealand Media and Entertainment Law (Thomson Reuters, 
Wellington, 2017) at 178. 
13  Ecclestone v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2009] EWHC 2779 (QB). 
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Telegraph Media Group Ltd,14 in response to a negative book review. The review alleged that the 
writer, Thornton, engaged in copy approval, a disapproved of journalistic practice which allows 
interviewees to read what is written about them and alter it. The Queen's Bench division of the High 
Court in both cases considered whether the alleged meanings were sufficiently serious to meet the 
threshold for defamation. Both claims failed.15 
In Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc, The Wall Street Journal published a story online announcing 
the existence of a list naming donors to al-Qaeda. The story included a hyperlink to the list, which 
named Jameel. Prima facie, Jameel had been seriously defamed by being falsely linked to a terrorist 
organisation. However, after the publisher proved that the list was only accessed by five people in 
England (three of whom were Jameel's associates), the Court of Appeal struck out the claim as an 
abuse of process. 
Each scenario raises the same question: is it justifiable to block the claimant's right to seek redress 
through the courts, either because allowing the claim would be a disproportionate infringement upon 
the defendant's right to freedom of expression, or because the claim is unworthy of the judicial 
resources it would demand? The volume of cases in which Jameel16 and Thornton17 have been 
  
14  Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414, [2011] 1 WLR 1985 (QB). 
15  Ecclestone v Telegraph Media Group, above n 13, was actually delivered before Thornton v Telegraph Media 
Group, above n 14. In Thornton, above n 14, at [82], Tugendhat J cites Ecclestone, stating that Sharp J "did 
clearly apply a threshold of seriousness". 
16  Cases in which Jameel has been successfully invoked include: Russell v Matthews [2016] NZDC 17743, 
which involved "indubitably defamatory remarks" communicated only to the claimant's father and a 
professional standards body, causing "infinitesimally small" reputational loss. Proceeding with the case would 
have demanded at least five days of preparation, a two day hearing (necessitating inconvenience to witnesses) 
and one day for the judge to write a judgment; X v Attorney-General of New Zealand (No 2), above n 6, in 
which the claimant had reported being the victim of sexual assault and harassment during her time in the New 
Zealand Navy and subsequently had her image used in Navy's promotional posts on Facebook. The claimant, 
arguing defamation by innuendo, asserted that those who knew of her experiences with the Navy would 
perceive her to be hypocritical and unprincipled upon viewing the pictures. There was no evidence that anyone 
in that small group saw the material or, if they did, that X's reputation was damaged in that way; Kaschke v 
Osler [2010] EWHC 1075 (QB), in which the offending blog posts were largely comprised of material 
published on the plaintiff's own website, and the defendant had removed the offending post from his blog and 
published a reply from the plaintiff; and several cases where, like Jameel, publication was very limited, see 
for example Davison v Habeeb [2011] EWHC 3031, [2012] 3 CMLR 104 (QB) where a blog post was 
accessed by five people at most; McDonnell v Adair [2009] NIQB 93 where the only recipients were an 
associate of the defendant and four members of the claimant's camp; and Citation plc v Ellis Whittam Ltd 
[2012] EWHC 764 (QB), where there was only one recipient. 
17  Publications which have failed to meet the Thornton threshold include: minor criticisms about the quality of 
the plaintiff's work performance in Daniels v British Broadcasting Corp [2010] EWHC 3057 (QB); a Daily 
Mail article about public figure Nancy Dell'Olio, which referred to her as a "man-eater" and contained 
"insulting" references to her lifestyle, money and wealth in Dell'Olio v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2011] 
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utilised demonstrate that blocking the claimant's access to the courts in such cases is not only 
justifiable, but necessary. However, the implementation of these principles in New Zealand requires 
careful consideration of how to balance the parties' competing rights; deserving claimants should not 
be faced with an insurmountable burden in an overzealous bid to protect free speech and court 
resources. 
III NEW ZEALAND'S STATUTORY CONTEXT 
A Defamation Act 1992 
Defamation law in New Zealand is largely grounded in common law.18 The Defamation Act 1992 
refines some aspects of the tort (such as defences and remedies) but offers little guidance as to a 
requirement of harm beyond s 4, which states that defamation is actionable "without proof of special 
damage," meaning the claimant is not required to show financial harm. The common law elements 
which a claimant must prove are as follows:19 
(1) there must be a statement made containing a defamatory meaning (or 'sting') about the 
claimant; 
(2) it must be published to one or more persons; and 
(3) it must identify the claimant.  
Damage to reputation is presumed at common law; the claimant does not need to supply proof. 20 
There is no legislative definition of defamatory meaning (element one), nor is there one definitive 
common law meaning, but the test articulated in the House of Lords decision Sim v Stretch is 
commonly used: the publication must "tend to lower the plaintiff in the eyes of right-thinking 
members of society generally".21 The adequacy of this test requires further consideration in light of 
Thornton, which suggests that it is an incomplete definition of defamatory meaning. 
B High Court Rules 2016 
Rule 15.1 of the High Court Rules 2016 governs the jurisdiction to strike out or stay a proceeding, 
in whole or in part. Where the Jameel principle is invoked, r 15.1(1)(d) permits the strike out of claims 
which are "otherwise an abuse of the process of the court". The Thornton principle can also be relevant 
  
EWHC 3472 (QB); and an autobiography which suggested that the claimant employee sent "pompous 
messages" in Briggs v Jordan [2013] EWHC 3205 (QB). 
18  Tobin and Harvey, above n 12, at 176. 
19  At 177. 
20  Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (CA), above n 4, at [72]. 
21  Tobin and Harvey, above n 12, at 183, citing Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 (HL) at 1240. The authors 
note that this is commonly supplemented with other tests, such as the "hatred, ridicule or contempt"" test 
(Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, 151 ER 340 (Exch)) and the "shun and avoid" test (Youssoupoff 
v MGM Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581 (CA) at 587). 
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during a strike out application if the defendant can prove that the claimant has no chance of 
successfully establishing that the tort occurred, engaging r 15.1(1)(a) which permits the strike out of 
a claim which discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action. 
IV UNITED KINGDOM POSITION 
New Zealand defamation law has developed largely from United Kingdom precedent. Until the 
passage of the Defamation Act 2013, a twin track approach to eliminating trivial claims was used in 
the United Kingdom: either they could be struck out on a Jameel basis, or they could fail (at strike 
out or trial) for not meeting the Thornton threshold. The Defamation Act 2013, an attempt to clarify 
the law and strengthen its freedom of expression protections,22 enacted s 1(1), which provides that "a 
statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the 
reputation of the claimant." Part IV outlines the Jameel and Thornton principles, then discusses the 
change introduced by s 1 and how this change was responded to by the Court of Appeal in Lachaux v 
Independent Print Ltd, the first appellate case to consider the new provision. It will be argued that s 
1 was designed by Parliament to fuse the Jameel and Thornton approaches, which the Court ignored 
in Lachaux, instead holding that the section simply codified Thornton. The Lachaux decision was a 
product of necessity, borne from the conceptual difficulties with giving effect to the section's intended 
meaning. 
A Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc 
The 2005 Court of Appeal decision of Jameel marked the first time an otherwise valid defamation 
claim was struck out on the basis that the claimant had suffered no real harm in the jurisdiction. As 
outlined in Part II, a hyperlinked document in the The Wall Street Journal named the claimant as a 
donor to al-Qaeda. During the proceedings the defendant produced evidence that only five people in 
England had accessed the document, three of whom were the claimant's associates. Despite the gravity 
of the allegations, the claim was struck out under the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) as an abuse 
of process on the basis that no "real or substantial tort" had been committed given the small number 
of readers.23 The Court considered that its responsibility to ensure that judicial resources are used 
proportionately required the strike out of defamation proceedings which do not serve the legitimate 
purpose of protecting the claimant's reputation.24 It also considered that the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK), which incorporated the freedom of expression protections in art 10 of the European Convention 
  
22  Erik Descheemaeker "Three Errors in the Defamation Act 2013" (2015) 6 JETL 24 at 24. 
23  Jameel, above n 3, at [70]–[71]. 
24  At [54] and [71]. 
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on Human Rights into domestic legislation,25 required strike out in such cases.26 The Court concluded 
that even if the claimant succeeded, "[t]he cost of the exercise will have been out of all proportion to 
what has been achieved."27 
That phrase has been interpreted as establishing a proportionality principle which allows claims 
to be struck out if they will cost disproportionately more in court resources than is justified by the 
amount in damages that the claimant stands to gain.28 Others contend that the "disproportionality" 
question asks whether the claim is a disproportionate infringement on the defendant's right to freedom 
of expression.29 While neither interpretation is incorrect, to take either as the complete ratio of the 
judgment is an oversimplification. The touchstone requirement of the Jameel principle is the absence 
of harm: to use the wording of the judgment, the absence "of a real and substantial tort".30 It is a 
necessary component of a finding that no real and substantial tort has occurred that the claim would 
incur disproportionate costs, but this is inadequate in itself to justify strike out.31 Similarly, if the 
claim appears to be a disproportionate infringement upon the defendant's freedom of expression this 
points to the absence of a real and substantial tort, but may not be sufficient in itself as proof that only 
minimal harm has occurred. 
B Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd 
In 2010, the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court delivered judgment in Thornton. The 
defendants' application for summary judgment was successful on the grounds that the words, which 
accused Thornton of copy approval, were not capable of being defamatory because they did not 
impute sufficiently reprehensible conduct. However, it was the subsequent discussion of a threshold 
of harm which went on to gain traction. The Judge canvassed numerous commonly used defamatory 
meaning tests, and observed that it was explicit or implicit in those tests that the statement must have 
a tendency to cause the claimant to suffer some sort of adverse consequences.32 Tugendhat J held that 
  
25  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended by Protocols No 11 
and 14) 213 UNTS 221 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953). 
26  Jameel, above n 3, at [55]. 
27  At [69]. 
28  Matthew Collins Collins on Defamation (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) at [7.46]; Ware v Johnson, 
above n 10, at [40]; and Opai v Culpan, above n 5, at [16]. Support in Jameel, above n 3, for this reading of 
"proportionality" can be found at [54] and [71]. 
29  Richard Parkes and others Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2017) at [2.3]. 
30  Jameel, above n 3, at [70], as cited in Heather Rogers and others Duncan and Neill on Defamation (4th ed, 
LexisNexis, 2015) at [4.02]. 
31  Mardas v New York Times Co [2008] EWHC 3135, [2009] EMLR 152 (QB) at [11]; and Lait v Evening 
Standard Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 859, [2011] 1 WLR 2973 at [42]. 
32  Thornton, above n 14, at [51] and [85]. 
40 (2019) 50 VUWLR 
a threshold of seriousness therefore applies to the meaning of a statement.33 Accordingly, the 
threshold test articulated by the Judge was whether the statement "substantially affects in an adverse 
manner the attitude of other people towards … [the claimant], or has a 'tendency' so to do."34 
Similarly to the Court in Jameel, his Honour considered that the threshold was required to secure 
conformity with the Human Rights Act.35 He also observed that the threshold was consistent with the 
presumption of damage; if a statement is not likely to substantially adversely affect attitudes towards 
the claimant, it would be illogical to presume that the claimant has suffered harm from it.36 
Further, Tugendhat J considered that a threshold was necessary in light of the principle developed 
by Jameel.37 On one view the threshold is simply an aspect of the Jameel principle because a claim 
in respect of a trivial statement which has caused no real harm is equally at risk of being struck out 
under Jameel due to lack of a real and substantial tort.38 However, this is not justification for melding 
the two distinct principles. Thornton places a burden of proof on the claimant, unlike Jameel. 
Additionally, the Thornton threshold has a far narrower scope than Jameel: it is concerned only with 
the meaning of the statement.  
There is nothing in the judgment to suggest that Tugendhat J considered that an analysis of 
whether the threshold is met requires an examination of factors external to the publication, such as 
the number of publishees.39 Tugendhat J incorporated the words "or has a 'tendency' so to do" in his 
formulation of the test to ensure that claimants were not required to prove that there had in fact been 
an effect upon them.40 The wording of the first part of the test ("substantially affects") suggests that 
claimants are not prohibited from producing such evidence, but they would only need to do so if there 
was doubt about whether the words were, on their face, defamatory. Arguably, Tugendhat J simply 
articulated a threshold of seriousness which was already inherent in the defamatory meaning 
  
33  At [89]. 
34  At [96]. 
35  At [89]. 
36  At [93]. 
37  At [89]. 
38  Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott "Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013" (2014) 77 MLR 87 at 
105. 
39  This reading of Thornton is supported by Collins, above n 28, at [6.44]; Opai v Culpan (No 2), above n 1, at 
[32]; and Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2015] EWHC 2242, [2016] QB 402 (QB) at [50] [Lachaux v 
Independent Print Ltd (HC)]. 
40  Thornton v Telegraph Media Group, above n 14, at [92]. 
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element,41 without overriding existing defamatory meaning tests.42 Nonetheless, the "threshold of 
seriousness" terminology quickly took hold. 
C Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 1 
Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 states that "a statement is not defamatory unless its 
publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant." The 
explanatory note for s 1 states that the section "builds on" Thornton and Jameel, but "raises the bar".43 
This leaves a crucial question unanswered: was s 1 intended to leave two distinct principles in play, 
or to amalgamate Thornton and Jameel? The latter view is better supported by parliamentary 
discussion and academic writing on the issue,44 despite some statements to the contrary.45 Section 1 
was not intended to completely eradicate the first element of the tort (the requirement for a claimant 
to prove the "sting" of the statement using the common law tests),46 rather it was intended to replace 
Thornton and Jameel by adding a preliminary element to be proved by the claimant. This new element 
would require a holistic examination of whether in all the circumstances serious harm has actually 
occurred or is likely to occur. 
During debate on the Bill which would become the 2013 Act, Lord McNally stated not only that 
the Bill would "raise the bar to a modest extent", but also that "a wide range of circumstances may be 
relevant in determining whether the serious harm test is met".47 Similarly, the Joint Committee 
  
41  This was the conclusion reached by Gould in Kim Gould "Locating a 'Threshold of Seriousness' in the 
Australian Tests of Defamation" (2017) 39 Syd LR 333. See also Lesses v Maras [2017] SASCFC 48, (2017) 
128 SASR 292 at [125]. 
42  It is clear that Tugendhat J did not intend to override the existing tests for three reasons: firstly, he does not 
purport to do so. Secondly, if he had, it would have the illogical result that any statement could be defamatory 
if, for some reason, it substantially affected attitudes towards the claimant, even if the statement was incapable 
of being defamatory at common law. Thirdly, Tugendhat J applied such tests in his subsequent judgments. 
See for example Waterson v Lloyd [2011] EWHC 3197 (QB) at [26]; and Miller v Associated Newspapers 
Ltd (No 2) [2011] EWHC 2677 (QB) at [33]. Accordingly, while external factors are not relevant to a Thornton 
analysis, the court can still consider contextual factors which would ordinarily be considered as part of the 
defamatory meaning analysis. This includes surrounding words and the nature of the publication itself: see 
Tobin and Harvey, above n 12, at 180–181 for a discussion of the role of context in the defamatory meaning 
analysis. 
43  Defamation Act 2013 (UK), s 1 (explanatory note) at 11. 
44  It is also the interpretation taken by Associate Judge Bell in Opai v Culpan (No 2), above n 1, at [75]. 
45  House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill Draft Defamation Bill 
(HL Paper 203 HC 930–I, 19 October 2011) at [27]. 
46  See Collins, above n 28, at [6.50]–[6.56], which provides a compelling argument as to why s 1 cannot have 
been intended to overrule the common law tests. The point is also made in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd 
(CA), above n 4, at [39]. 
47  (17 December 2012) 741 GBPD HL 422–423. 
42 (2019) 50 VUWLR 
recommended that the judge should consider the context, including rapid corrections or apologies.48 
The consideration of a wide range of circumstances (including corrections and apologies) is in itself 
a significant raising of the Thornton bar, given that Thornton was concerned only with the meaning 
of the statement. However, it would have been clearer that Parliament intended for wider 
circumstances to be considered if the chosen wording was "a statement is not actionable" rather than 
"not defamatory".49 The language of actionability is more consistent with Jameel, which accepts that 
a statement can be simultaneously defamatory and not actionable. 
An analysis of academic writing published during and shortly after the passage of s 1 reveals a 
widespread understanding that s 1 went beyond Thornton to incorporate the wider considerations 
characteristic of a Jameel analysis. Collins on Defamation, stating the law as at September 2013, 
argued that it was clear s 1 went beyond codifying Thornton, enabling claims to be struck out where 
"having regard to all the circumstances, there is so little at stake that the claim ought not to be 
permitted to proceed."50 This is a ground for strike out which, prior to the Act, would have come 
under Jameel jurisdiction. The relevant circumstances suggested by Collins included the extent of 
publication, the nature of the recipients, any evidence as to whether or not recipients believed the 
allegations and whether there was an apology or correction.51 Collins noted that serious harm could 
be inferred in some cases, at least when determining whether the statement is "likely to" cause serious 
harm, but the inference would not be drawn on the basis of the words alone; the manner and extent of 
publication would also be relevant.52 The factors listed as relevant by Collins, and the need to consider 
the manner and extent of publication, are consistent with a Jameel inquiry. 
Duncan and Neill on Defamation observed that while the meaning of s 1 was "open to debate",53 
in the authors' view the section required two prongs to be satisfied: firstly, the publication must convey 
a meaning that has a tendency to cause serious harm to reputation and secondly, it must be shown that 
in the circumstances (including the extent and status of the publication, the nature of its audience and 
any correction or apology), serious harm has been caused or is likely to be caused. On this approach, 
the question of whether the publication caused or was likely to cause serious harm again goes beyond 
a Thornton-style analysis of the meaning. The authors considered that in light of their approach, it 
was "doubtful" that the common law presumption of damage to reputation had survived.54 At the time 
  
48  Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, above n 45, at [30]. 
49  See Collins, above n 28, at [7.48]; and Parkes and others, above n 29, at [2.5]. 
50  Collins, above n 28, at [7.44]. 
51  At [7.30]–[7.34]. 
52  At [7.30]. 
53   Rogers and others, above n 30, at [1.11]. Stating the law as at November 2014. 
54  At [4.06]. 
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the text was published there had been only one judgment at High Court level which considered s 1: 
Cooke v MGN Ltd.55 The authors observed that as per Bean J in Cooke, serious harm could be inferred 
in cases of "grave" allegations.56 
D Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd 
In a decision as heavily praised as it was criticised,57 the Court of Appeal in Lachaux ignored s 
1's intended effect.58 The Court held that s 1 is essentially a codification of Thornton, and that an 
inference of serious harm can be drawn where the statement conveys a serious imputation.59 A 
defendant could seek to rebut the inference at a strike out application or present their arguments at 
trial.60 It was acknowledged that "where necessary or appropriate" the context in which the words are 
used could also be relevant, for example, if the words appeared in a newspaper or widely accessed 
blog.61 The Court held that the Jameel jurisdiction could still be relevant in rare cases where s 1 
appeared satisfied but the claim was disproportionate for other reasons.62 
Although the replacement of the common law language of "tendency" with the "is likely to" 
terminology in s 1 was a considered choice by Parliament,63 the Court also held that "is likely to" 
means "tendency".64 This decision is significant because the terms are distinct; whilst "tendency" 
permits a more abstract analysis, determining whether a publication "is likely to" cause serious harm 
arguably requires a court to consider whether the publication might, on the particular facts, cause 
  
55  Cooke v MGN Ltd [2014] EWHC 2831, [2015] 1 WLR 895 (QB). 
56  Rogers and others, above n 30, at [4.10], citing Cooke v MGN Ltd, above 55. The example given in Cooke 
was an accusation in a national newspaper of terrorism or paedophilia. 
57  Greg Callus "Defendants should not be gleeful at prospect of Supreme Court allowing appeal on defamation 
test in Lachaux case" Press Gazette (online ed, United Kingdom, 10 April 2018); Iain Wilson and Tom Double 
"Business as usual? The Court of Appeal considers the threshold for bringing a libel claim in Lachaux v 
Independent Print Ltd" (16 September 2017) Inforrm's Blog <https://inforrm.org>; Michael Cross "Landmark 
appeal judgment dents libel threshold hopes" The Law Society Gazette (online ed, United Kingdom, 12 
September 2017); and Nicola Cain "Seriously limiting serious harm" (12 September 2017) RPC 
<www.rpc.co.uk>. 
58  The decision has been appealed to the Supreme Court and was heard by the Court in November 2018. 
59  Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (CA), above n 4, at [70]. 
60  At [69]–[70]. 
61  At [73]. 
62  At [79] and [82]. 
63  Collins, above n 28, at [7.27]. 
64  Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (CA), above n 4, at [46]–[50]. 
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actual harm in the future.65 As observed in Gatley on Libel and Slander, the decision to read "is likely 
to" as "tendency" effectively renders the first part of s 1(1) redundant; why would a claimant attempt 
the more difficult task of proving the statement has caused serious harm, when they could simply 
point to the tendency of the statement to do so, as demonstrated by the words alone?66 
The interpretation of s 1 as a straightforward codification of Thornton (but with "substantially" 
changed to "serious") is inconsistent with Parliament's intention, a point which has been made 
forcefully by commentators.67 Accepting that the Court knowingly departed from Parliament's 
intention, the natural question must be: why? This article argues in Part VI that fusion of the two 
conceptually distinct approaches opposes the long-standing presumption of damage and creates an 
unreasonably high burden for claimants. The Lachaux judgment reflects a Court desperate to ensure 
the law of defamation remains workable. 
V NEW ZEALAND'S CASE LAW: APPROACH TO THORNTON 
AND JAMEEL 
Following CPA Australia Ltd v New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants and Sellman v 
Slater, the Thornton threshold has established an initial foothold in New Zealand, albeit on insecure 
ground. It is yet to face appellate scrutiny and thus far the courts have not clarified precisely what the 
threshold requires or which party bears the burden of proof. New Zealand judges have also varied in 
their willingness to apply Jameel. Although it has been applied twice at High Court level,68 in other 
cases judges have offered multiple reasons for its inapplicability. These include: that the case was 
primarily concerned with a jurisdictional issue and its precedent should not be extended further; that 
New Zealand does not have an equivalent to the Civil Procedure Rules (UK) nor is it a party to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention which informed the Human Rights Act);69 
and that it threatens the right of access to justice. The following discussion highlights that it is only 
  
65  Richard Parkes and others Gatley on Libel and Slander (12th ed, 2nd supplement, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
2017) at [2.6]. However, the authors anticipated that in most cases where a claim would have survived the 
"tendency" test under Thornton, the statement would also satisfy s 1(1). 
66  At [2.6]. 
67  See Cain, above n 57, who described it as: "a disappointing and regressive judgment for defendants, which 
contrasts with the indications given by Parliament as to how they envisaged the new section would protect 
defendants"; and Jonathan Coad "Landmark appeal judgment dents libel threshold hopes" The Law Society 
Gazette (online ed, United Kingdom, 12 September 2017). 
68  X v Attorney-General (No 2), above n 6; and Opai v Culpan, above n 5. It has also applied by the District 
Court in Craig v Stiekema [2017] NZDC 15914, [2018] DCR 291 (this was later overturned by the High Court 
because its application was unsupported by the facts); and Russell v Matthews, above n 16. 
69  Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), s 1. See the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, above n 25. 
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the last of these arguments which carries any significant weight, and on balance, this concern is 
outweighed by the numerous advantages of adopting Jameel in New Zealand. 
A Jameel in New Zealand 
1 The issue in Jameel was jurisdictional 
The first New Zealand case to consider Jameel was Karam v Parker, a claim brought by Joe 
Karam regarding posts online criticising his involvement with David Bain. Associate Judge Sargisson 
distinguished Jameel due to dissimilar facts (the posts in Karam were read by a "significant number 
of people"),70 but she gave two broader grounds for doubting Jameel's applicability in New Zealand. 
Her Honour's first ground was that the primary issue in Jameel was whether the case should be tried 
in the United Kingdom or another jurisdiction.71 The numerous cases which have applied Jameel in 
the United Kingdom72 demonstrate that this is an overly narrow reading of the Jameel ratio and the 
wording of the judgment does not support such restricted application.73 This ground carries no weight 
following Katz J's Opai v Culpan judgment, which confirmed that the reasoning in Jameel is not so 
confined.74 
2 The Civil Procedure Rules are dissimilar to New Zealand's High Court Rules 
2016 
Associate Judge Sargisson's second ground for distinguishing Jameel in Karam was the "different 
legislative context" of New Zealand.75 This argument was picked up in Deliu v Hong, the only clear 
rejection of Jameel in New Zealand case law. Associate Judge Osborne in Deliu canvassed the 
differences between New Zealand's High Court Rules and the United Kingdom's Civil Procedure 
Rules, noting that the Civil Procedure Rules have the overriding objective of dealing with cases 
"justly",76 which expressly includes proportionality considerations.77 By comparison, concepts of 
  
70  Karam v Parker HC Auckland CIV-2010-404-3038, 29 July 2011 at [55]. 
71  At [53]. 
72  See n 16. 
73  One way to test the theory is to consider: was the existence of a more appropriate jurisdiction in which Jameel 
could bring his case crucial to the Court's decision to strike out the claim? Several paragraphs in Jameel, 
above n 3, suggest it was not, for example at [56], the Court notes that Duke of Brunswick v Harmer (1849) 
14 QB 185, 117 ER 75 (KB) (which did not involve any jurisdictional issue) would, if heard in modern times, 
be struck out as an abuse of process. See also [57] and [68]–[71]. 
74  Opai v Culpan, above n 5, at [22]. Associate Judge Sargisson later acknowledges this herself in Ware v 
Johnson, above n 10, at [46]. 
75  Karam v Parker, above n 70, at [54]. 
76  Rule 1.1. 
77  Deliu v Hong, above n 8, at [182], citing r 1.1(2)(c). 
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proportionality are not "spelt out" in the High Court Rules.78 The discussion was obiter, because the 
Judge held that even if Jameel was applicable in New Zealand, he would not have applied it given 
that one of the parties stood to receive substantial damages.79 
Ronald Young J's judgment in Moodie v Strachan was released two months after that rejection of 
Jameel. Although holding that Jameel was inapplicable on the facts, his Honour could:80 
… see no reason why New Zealand courts would not be prepared to stay (or strike out) civil proceedings 
that cannot serve the legitimate purpose of the cause of action pleaded.  
Contrary to Associate Judge Osborne, Ronald Young J located similarities between the Civil 
Procedure Rules and New Zealand's High Court Rules, observing that the High Court Rules "have, as 
their express object, the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of proceedings."81 
When Associate Judge Sargisson confronted the issue four years later in Ware v Johnson,82 her 
views were more aligned with Ronald Young J's analysis. She considered that the High Court Rules 
were sufficiently similar to the Civil Procedure Rules "to justify striking out proceedings that cannot 
serve the legitimate purpose of the cause of action pleaded."83 Were it not for the availability of a 
qualified privilege defence, her Honour "could well" have applied Jameel.84 The approach taken by 
Ronald Young J and Associate Judge Sargisson is preferable to Associate Judge Osborne's more rigid 
reading of New Zealand's High Court Rules. The absence of proportionality as an express overriding 
objective of the High Court Rules is not evidence of its irrelevance. A holistic interpretation of the 
Rules is more aligned with the policy goal of sensibly allocating court resources. 
In Opai v Culpan, the first High Court case to apply Jameel, Katz J also considered that there was 
sufficient emphasis placed on proportionality in New Zealand's High Court Rules.85 Her Honour 
considered that the general trajectory of recent procedural developments "has been to improve the 
  
78  At [182]. 
79  At [194]. 
80  Moodie v Strachan, above n 7, at [60]. This wording should not be overanalysed. The corollary of there being 
no real and substantial tort is that the claim cannot serve the legitimate purpose of vindicating reputation, 
because there is nothing to vindicate. Conversely, it is difficult to imagine a claim which does not serve the 
legitimate purpose of vindicating reputation where there is a real and substantial tort. Accordingly, the 
"legitimate purpose" wording should not be interpreted as changing the core of the Jameel principle: the lack 
of a real and substantial tort. 
81  At [58], citing r 1.2. 
82  Ware v Johnson, above n 10. 
83  At [46]. 
84  At [47]. 
85  Opai v Culpan, above n 5, at [48]. 
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overall efficiency and cost-effectiveness of litigation."86 Opai concerned a claim brought by a police 
employee regarding workplace documents written by her supervisor, Culpan, which Opai 
characterised as a "[m]alevolent campaign to vilify."87 Associate Judge Bell, who initially heard the 
case, struck out elements of Opai's claim which he found to be Jameel disproportionate.88 Katz J, who 
reviewed that decision in 2016, confirmed that aspects of the claim could be struck out on Jameel 
grounds.89  
3  The Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) is dissimilar to the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 
In Opai, the plaintiff also submitted that Jameel is inapplicable in New Zealand because it drew 
on the Human Rights Act, a statute which has no equivalent in New Zealand.90 Katz J succinctly 
disposed of this argument by reference to s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
(NZBORA), which, like the Human Rights Act, recognises the right to freedom of expression.91 After 
comparing the two Acts, Katz J concluded that the NZBORA placed a similarly high value on freedom 
of expression to the Human Rights Act.92 Her Honour observed that the importance of this right has 
gained increased recognition in recent years, and linked this with the growing desire to strike out 
trivial claims.93   
Section 5 of the NZBORA does permit the limitation of NZBORA rights where such limitations 
are "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." The censure of defamatory statements 
which have caused the claimant substantial harm to reputation exemplifies a justifiable limitation on 
the right to freedom of speech. The same cannot be said of claims regarding publications which have 
caused insignificant harm. This is particularly pertinent where the speech in respect of which the 
claimant is suing can be classed as significant. Speech can be viewed as existing on a spectrum, with 
political commentary typically afforded the highest significance, and abuse and gossip about private 
facts at the other end. Because s 5 mandates a balancing exercise, NZBORA affords greater protection 
to significant speech.94 The censure of significant speech is more likely to be viewed as a 
  
86  At [42]. 
87  Opai v Culpan (No 2), above n 1, at [60]. 
88  At [87]–[91]. 
89  Opai v Culpan, above n 5, at [92]. Note however that Associate Judge Bell's decision was in part overturned: 
see [93]. 
90  At [51]. 
91  At [52]–[53]. 
92  At [53].   
93  At [89]. 
94  See Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 regarding the balancing test mandated by s 5. 
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disproportionate infringement on the defendant's freedom of expression, which adds weight to the 
defendant's assertion that there is no real and substantial tort. Accordingly, Jameel applications made 
in respect of significant speech may be viewed more favourably.95  
4  Jameel threatens access to justice 
The better arguments for exercising caution with Jameel are based on the threat posed to the right 
to access justice. Even Jameel's supporters have acknowledged this danger.96 This concern was raised 
by Associate Judge Osborne in Deliu, who considered that adopting Jameel would be an 
unprecedented departure from "the traditional approach" to access to justice in New Zealand.97 The 
issue was taken up again by Palmer J in Sellman. The Sellman judgment, released several months 
following Opai, concerned proceedings brought against Cameron Slater and his associates regarding 
blog posts which made various allegations about the claimant public health professionals. Palmer J 
demonstrated significant reluctance to approve of Jameel and expressed concern about the jurisdiction 
being "routinely" utilised by the courts,98 but he did accept that it was "conceivable" that the 
jurisdiction could be used in "extreme circumstances".99 
The concerns raised by Palmer J and Associate Judge Osborne are worthy of consideration. New 
Zealand places "high constitutional value" on the right of individuals to access the courts,100 so where 
this is threatened, the conceptual basis for doing so must be scrutinised. Palmer J highlighted that rule 
of law concerns are also engaged, stating:101 
… the rule of law requires that, except in the rarest of circumstances where it is clearly justified, the courts 
themselves should not override the right of an individual to access the courts to vindicate their actionable 
legal rights; society's collective financial interests notwithstanding.  
The Jameel doctrine is grounded in abuse of process and tied to an analysis of whether the claim 
is worthy of the expense it would incur. The primary question is of costs to the court, but the time and 
  
95  See Lait v Evening Standard Ltd, above n 31, in which the Evening Standard reported substantial expenditure 
incurred by the claimant MP. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court's application of Jameel and noted 
at [42] that freedom of expression considerations are particularly important, "where a defence of honest 
comment is advanced by a responsible – I emphasise the adjective – journalist." 
96  Opai v Culpan, above n 5, at [64]; and Ware v Johnson, above n 10, at [48]. 
97  Deliu v Hong, above n 8, at [192]. 
98  Sellman v Slater, above n 1, at [60]. 
99  At [59]. 
100  At [60]. 
101  At [61]. 
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costs incurred by the parties is also relevant.102 This inquiry is arguably at odds with the conceptual 
foundations of defamation as a tort, and the importance placed upon restoration of reputation. 
Claimants in a defamation case may have little interest in monetary gain, rather they seek the 
opportunity to be publicly vindicated.103 It also creates the potential for the court to pick apart a claim, 
weighing the value of each pleading against the potential cost to the court to determine whether it is 
"worth the candle"104 – an exercise which seems intuitively odd. In light of this, it is sensible to 
question whether it is appropriate to strike out otherwise actionable claims because the stakes appear 
low to the court. That the claimant has invested the time and effort necessary to file the proceedings 
demonstrates that to the claimant, the stakes are clearly high enough.  
5  Should Jameel be endorsed in New Zealand? 
The existence of r 15.1(1)(d) demonstrates that Parliament could envision circumstances where 
the strike out of an otherwise actionable claim as an abuse of process would be "clearly justified",105 
to use Palmer J's phrasing.106 This article argues that a defamation claim in respect of non-existent or 
trivial harm exemplifies such a case, and the justifications for endorsing Jameel in New Zealand are 
numerous.  
Firstly, allowing a trivial claim to proceed does not give appropriate recognition to the defendant's 
NZBORA rights. It is true that in such cases the defendant may succeed with an alternative defence 
(such as truth or honest opinion), or if they lose, they may only have to pay nominal damages. But as 
noted by Katz J in Opai, citing Lonzim Plc v Sprague, "the fact of being sued at all is a serious 
interference with freedom of expression",107 hence the desire to have unworthy defamation claims 
struck out at the earliest possible stage. A requirement that a substantial tort has been committed 
before the court will hear a defamation claim is a reasonable limitation on the claimant's right to access 
the courts in favour of the defendant's right to freedom of speech. 
Allowing the proceedings to continue is not necessarily in the claimant's interests either. 
Claimants may bring trivial claims because they are unaware of how minimal the actual harm to their 
  
102  At [59]; and Ware v Johnson, above n 10, at [40]. 
103  Deliu v Hong, above n 8, at [192]. 
104  Jameel, above n 3, at [69]. 
105  As noted in Part III(B), r 15.1(1)(d) of the High Court Rules 2016 allows claims to be struck out which are 
"an abuse of the process of the court". 
106  Sellman v Slater, above n 1, at [61]. 
107  Lonzim Plc v Sprague [2009] EWHC 2838 (QB) at [33] per Tugendhat J, as cited in Opai v Culpan, above n 
5, at [53]. 
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reputation is,108 or because they are unable to objectively assess the actual harm to their reputation 
and perceive it as worse than it is.109 In such cases, it is doubtful whether the court does the claimant 
any favours by allowing the claim to proceed, at great cost to him or her, especially given that this 
will likely bring greater attention to the offending statements.110 Even a successful claimant may walk 
away out of pocket due to exorbitant legal costs.111 Conversely, if the claim was doomed to fail, at 
least a Jameel strike out puts an expeditious end to the claimant's expenses. 
Further, it is not only the parties whom the court must consider. Although it would not be justified 
to exercise the Jameel jurisdiction on the basis of disproportionate costs alone, it is certainly a factor 
worth considering. Defamation trials bring significant cost to the courts (and, by extension, the 
public), a cost which is difficult to justify where the proceedings are being used to air objectively 
petty grievances of which no real harm has resulted. Additionally, while a Jameel strike out does 
impinge upon the claimant's right to access the courts, putting a prompt end to trivial claims enhances 
access to the courts generally by allowing for more efficient use of court resources.112 
Finally, there are no grounds to suggest that if the Jameel principle receives unequivocal 
endorsement from an appellate court, it will be "routinely" invoked.113 All judges who have 
considered Jameel have emphasised that strike out jurisdiction is to be exercised cautiously, 
particularly where the claimant has a prima facie arguable case.114 Trivial claims are the minority, 
perhaps owing to the significant investment of time and money which bringing a claim requires. They 
will grow rarer still if claimants know that courts will strike them out. Accordingly, while the 
jurisdiction should only be utilised in appropriate cases, there is no need for excessive reluctance 
where its application is supported by the facts. The Jameel jurisdiction is a valuable tool when such 
cases arise.  
Jameel gives greater priority to freedom of expression rights and goes some way to correcting the 
balance of a plaintiff-friendly tort. It does not create an unfair hurdle for claimants, rather it 
appropriately places the burden on the defendant to prove that no substantial tort has been committed. 
As the facts of Jameel illustrate, it is typically the defendants who will be in the best position to supply 
  
108  This was arguably the case in Jameel, above n 3: the Court doubted at [38] that Jameel would have brought 
the claim had he known that dissemination was so limited in England. 
109  CPA Australia Ltd v New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, above n 1, at [114]. 
110  At [116]. 
111  Opai v Culpan, above n 5, at [81]. 
112  At [63]. 
113  At [68]. 
114  Moodie v Strachan, above n 7, at [60]; Opai v Culpan (No 2), above n 1, at [78]; Opai v Culpan, above n 5, 
at [64] and [68]; Russell v Matthews, above n 16, at [12]; X v Attorney-General of New Zealand (No 2), above 
n 6, at [19]; and Craig v Stiekema [2018] NZHC 838, [2018] NZAR 1003, at [35] [Craig v Stiekema (HC)]. 
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evidence, for example regarding the number of people who have accessed the statements. Therefore 
the burden is correctly placed.115 The judiciary is fully cognisant of the need to only use a tool which 
restricts the claimant's right to access the courts in appropriate cases and Palmer J's scepticism of the 
principle could invite unwarranted judicial hesitancy. Endorsement of the doctrine at appellate level 
is therefore desirable to cement its grounding in New Zealand law.116  
B  Thornton in New Zealand 
CPA Australia Ltd and Sellman are the only New Zealand cases which explicitly address why the 
Thornton threshold should apply in New Zealand. Associate Judge Bell's Opai decision applied the 
Thornton defamatory meaning threshold without analysing why it applied in New Zealand.117 
Fitzgerald J's High Court judgment in Craig v Stiekema could be read as an endorsement of Thornton 
but her Honour disclaimed that she had no "concluded view."118 
Dobson J in CPA Australia Ltd endorsed the application of a harm threshold in New Zealand 
because his Honour considered that it gave greater protection to freedom of expression rights 
enshrined in s 14 of NZBORA.119 Dobson J did not directly address Jameel and, unfortunately, the 
judgment confused the Thornton and s 1(1) thresholds.120 Whilst ostensibly endorsing Thornton, 
Dobson J referred to "serious harm" rather than "substantial harm" and concluded that the approach 
articulated in Gatley on Libel and Slander "appears appropriate."121 The Gatley excerpt referred to is 
not a straightforward restatement of the Thornton threshold, but a discussion of multiple United 
Kingdom cases. Citing Cammish v Hughes,122 the Gatley authors state that satisfaction of the harm 
  
115  This was noted by Palmer J in Sellman v Slater, above n 1, at [65] (although it was in the context of the 
Thornton principle). 
116  Should the issue come before an appellate court, the court should also confirm whether the defendant 
submitting a Jameel application can produce evidence of any external factors, or whether this is 
circumscribed. The author submits that any evidence which speaks to whether there is a real and substantial 
tort should be permitted. This reflects the approach in Opai v Culpan (No 2), above n 1, at [75]. On this view, 
evidence that the claimant already had a poor reputation, that the statement was not believed by the publishees, 
or that it was published only to the claimant's friends, could be relevant (though not necessarily decisive) 
because it may point to the absence of a real and substantial tort. Because there is existing case law holding 
that these details are not relevant to whether defamation has occurred, such as Hough v London Express 
Newspaper Ltd [1940] 2 KB 507 (CA), explicit clarification is desirable. 
117  Opai v Culpan (No 2), above n 1, at [32]. Unfortunately the point was not picked up in Katz J's review, which 
focused more on Jameel.  
118  Craig v Stiekema (HC), above n 114, at [51]–[52]. 
119  CPA Australia Ltd v New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, above n 1, at [115]. 
120  This point was also made by Gould, above n 41. 
121  CPA Australia Ltd v New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants, above n 1, at [120]. 
122  Cammish v Hughes [2012] EWCA Civ 1655 at 40. 
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threshold is a "multi-factorial question" which "will require the court to consider matters such as… 
the status and number of publishees and whether the allegations were believed, [and] the status of the 
publisher".123 This article submits that those factors are better considered under a Jameel analysis.124 
Accordingly, although Dobson J's endorsement of Thornton is cause for celebration, the confusion of 
Thornton with the s 1 threshold renders the judgment of limited usefulness. In any case, the statements 
were obiter because CPA Australia's claim failed on a different ground. 
The next case to consider Thornton was Sellman (the facts of which are discussed above). Palmer 
J considered that a minimum threshold of harm to reputation applied, and that this method of shaping 
defamation law was preferable to Jameel.125 Despite citing Thornton as authority, the harm threshold 
conceptualised by Palmer J was a vastly watered-down approach. Rather than placing a burden on the 
claimant to show that the statement had a tendency to cause substantial harm, Palmer J held that due 
to the common law presumption of damage, the defendant bears the onus of proving that the statement 
caused "less than minor" harm to the plaintiff's reputation, thus rebutting the presumption.126  
Although Palmer J appeared to consider this a straightforward reading of Thornton,127 it is a 
misinterpretation which should not be endorsed. Thornton treated the substantial harm threshold as 
part of the defamatory meaning element, an element which must be proved by the claimant. Therefore 
it is logical that any extension of this element128 must be satisfied by the claimant. This is not 
inconsistent with the presumption of damage; the presumption becomes relevant once it has been 
proven that the statement has a tendency to cause harm.129 
  
123  Parkes and others, above n 29, at [2.4]. Regrettably, the Court in Cammish did not elaborate on this, or specify 
what factors might be relevant. Gould, above n 41, considered that "support for both" interpretations of 
Thornton can be found in Cammish.  
124  It is unclear what authorities the authors of Gatley on Libel and Slander were drawing on when they included 
these factors as part of a Thornton analysis: Parkes and others, above n 29. One citation was supplied, but this 
was for a High Court judgment delivered in 2009 (Haji-Ioannou v Dixon [2009] EWHC 178 (QB)), which is 
of limited use in expounding the principles of Thornton, a judgment released in 2010. 
125  Sellman v Slater, above n 1, at [63]. 
126  At [3] and [69]. 
127  At [62]. 
128  If indeed it is an extension. As noted in Part IV(B), on one view it is simply an articulation of what was 
already inherent in the defamatory meaning element. 
129  This is in accordance with the explanation given in Rogers and others, above n 30, at [4.04], that Thornton 
retains the presumption but "confine[s] the application of that principle to cases which reached an appropriate 
level of gravity." This is also the approach taken by the Court of Appeal in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd 
(CA), above n 4, at [70]. 
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Additionally, Palmer J replaced the requirement for substantial harm with a requirement for more 
than minor harm.130 No authority was cited for lowering the standard. Palmer J considered that serious 
harm was too high a bar, noting that defamation which causes less than serious but more than minor 
harm to reputation could be reflected in a nominal award of damages, combined with a declaration of 
defamation.131 This is in conflict with Jameel which if utilised to its fullest extent, could eliminate 
claims where only nominal damages are likely to be awarded.132 
1 Should Thornton be endorsed in New Zealand? 
The Thornton threshold is a valuable addition to New Zealand's defamation law, and the 
endorsements of Dobson and Palmer JJ highlight the judicial appetite for it (although unfortunately, 
the thresholds the judges articulated differed from the original Thornton threshold in crucial ways). 
Thornton raises little conceptual difficulty and, arguably, is already inherent in the defamatory 
meaning tests. It goes some way to protecting freedom of expression rights without creating an 
unreasonable hurdle for claimants. Worthy claimants will not need to provide evidence to satisfy the 
threshold, the court need only examine whether the words have a tendency to cause substantial harm.  
Regrettably, neither of the New Zealand decisions which endorsed the Thornton threshold went 
on to correctly restate the test. Clarification is required in several respects. It should be confirmed that 
it is the claimant who bears the burden of proof, and that the inquiry is confined to the meaning of the 
words only. It must also be conclusively decided what level the threshold is pitched at. This article 
proposes that a requirement of substantial harm is a sufficient bar to trivial claims and is a 
straightforward application of Thornton,133 whereas a requirement of more than minor harm is 
unsupported by precedent and, in any case, provides a weaker barrier to trivial claims. It is unclear 
whether serious harm differs from substantial harm in practical effect, or if the wording change by the 
United Kingdom Parliament was merely symbolic.134 Further development of the case law will 
improve clarity regarding how grave the meaning of a statement need be before the substantial harm 
standard is satisfied. 
VI TWIN TRACK IS PREFERABLE TO FUSION 
A possible but inadvisable method of implementing Jameel and Thornton in New Zealand would 
be fusion of the two tracks. There are multiple ways that fusion could occur, with the obvious 
approach being legislation based upon the existing blueprint for fusion: s 1 of the Defamation Act 
  
130 Sellman v Slater, above n 1, at [68. 
131  At [68]. 
132  Opai v Culpan (No 2), above n 1, at [75]. 
133  Tugendhat J considered at [95] of Thornton, above n 14, that "substantial" was "the lowest threshold that 
might be envisaged" from the case law. 
134  Parkes and others, above n 65, at [2.7]; and Collins, above n 28, at [7.18]. 
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2013. Were New Zealand to take the approach envisioned by s 1, harm would become an additional 
ingredient of the tort to be proved by the claimant on the balance of probabilities. This would require 
the claimant to show, by reference to external evidence such as the number of publishees, that harm 
occurred (or is likely to). The following discussion canvasses the benefits of fusion but concludes that 
it is not desirable. This article does not assert that fusion would, by necessity, produce disastrous 
results, but argues that it is an unnecessary complication of two distinct principles. 
The first advantage of fusion is that it goes further in tipping the scales for defendants. Placing an 
affirmative burden on the claimant to prove harm up front provides a stronger barrier to trivial claims. 
Depending on how excessively plaintiff-friendly one perceives the tort, this could be considered a 
reasonable correction to the balance. The problem is that it tips the scales too far. Requiring claimants 
to supply evidence of harmful consequences eradicates the presumption of harm, which is a feature 
of defamation law precisely because "[o]btaining evidence of serious reputational harm is notoriously 
difficult."135 As noted in Jameel, the presumption has strong pragmatic utility, and its removal opens 
the door to both parties marshalling witnesses to attest that they did or did not consider that the article 
damaged the claimant's reputation.136 This is an unreasonable hurdle to expect claimants to jump. 
Of course, both the High Court and Court of Appeal Lachaux judgments acknowledged that harm 
could be inferred where the meaning of the allegation was sufficiently serious.137 In every defamation 
case, then, the judge would need to decide whether or not to draw an inference, potentially leading to 
inconsistent outcomes.138 To make it even simpler to satisfy this element, the legislation could 
incorporate Thornton-style language, instructing the courts to draw an inference if the publication has 
a "tendency" to cause harm. This route would go some way to circumvent what the Court of Appeal 
in Lachaux labelled the "conceptual impenetrability" of s 1.139 It would lessen the burden on claimants 
and allow inferences to be drawn as a matter of course, based on the meaning of the statement alone.  
This form of fused approach would not prevent defendants from adducing evidence to count 
against drawing an inference, as they would in a Jameel application. Accordingly, the approach is 
largely unobjectionable, but it does not offer anything beyond what is achieved through keeping the 
principles separate. In fact, it is essentially the method articulated by the Court of Appeal in Lachaux, 
  
135  Wilson and Double, above n 57. 
136  Jameel, above n 1, at [31]. Alternative ways for a claimant to prove harm include commissioning an opinion 
poll survey, or producing a selection of comments from the blogosphere: Cooke v MGN Ltd, above n 55, at 
[43]. 
137  Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (HC), above n 39, at [57]; and Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (CA), above 
n 4, at [70]. 
138  Parkes and others, above n 65, at v. 
139  Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (CA), above n 4, at [62]. 
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which the Court did not characterise as a fused approach at all.140 If this approach were adopted it 
would be crucial to ensure that defendants are able to make arguments against drawing such an 
inference in a strike out application or other preliminary stage, so as not to weaken a key strength of 
Jameel: the ability to extinguish trivial claims early. 
Another benefit of fusion is its potential to simplify matters for the parties and the courts because 
it necessitates only one inquiry: in all the circumstances, has the claimant suffered harm? This would 
end confusion caused by the overlap between Jameel and Thornton, which both hinge on a 
requirement of minimal harm. However, fusion creates problems of its own. In particular, a flow on 
effect of eradicating the presumption that damage occurs at the moment of publication is the timing 
issue it creates. Because the s 1 approach requires an examination of whether, in the circumstances, 
serious harm has actually occurred, there is the potential for claims to drift "in and out of 
actionability", depending on what consequences have occurred.141 To use the facts of Jameel as an 
example, suppose that a month after the hyperlink was posted, some readers tracked Jameel down and 
threw bricks through his windows. At that point, he has suffered harm – but is it too late? To avoid 
uncertainty, there must be a point in time at which the tort crystallises and no subsequent events can 
be considered. The judges in Cooke and Lachaux considered this question and reached different 
answers: Bean J held that the tort crystallised on the date proceedings were brought,142 while Davis 
LJ considered that it was the moment of publication.143 Not only is this inconsistency troublesome, 
but the decision to freeze time at the moment of publication for s 1 purposes also undermines the 
desire to encourage swift and prominent apologies.144 
Retaining the presumption of damage avoids the need to address this question: it is conceptually 
uncomplicated to confine the Thornton analysis to the meaning of the words alone and, as such, the 
tort crystallises once those words are published. This also ensures predictability because if the 
substantial harm analysis is confined to the meaning of the words only, defendants can make an 
objective analysis pre-publication as to whether the words are defamatory.145 Any events which took 
  
140  As discussed in Part IV(D), the Court interpreted s 1 as a codification of Thornton. 
141  Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (CA), above n 4, at [60]. It should be noted that the Jameel principle does 
permit this, in that a statement could transition from defamatory to non-defamatory if the harm was largely 
or entirely mitigated post-publication, for example through a successful lawsuit over the same subject matter, 
or a public apology: Hamaizia v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 848 (QB). 
Crucially though, Jameel does not enable a statement to transition from non-defamatory to defamatory. 
142  Cooke v MGN Ltd, above n 55, at [32]. 
143  Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (CA), above n 4, at [67]. A third possibility, the date at which the issue is 
determined, was flagged by Warby J in Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (HC), above n 39, at [67]. 
144  Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, above n 45, at [10]. This matter was decisive in Cooke v MGN 
Ltd, above n 55, in which the claim was struck out on s 1 grounds due to a prominent apology. 
145  Callus, above n 57. 
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place post-publication (for example, an apology) could only be relevant to a Jameel application. 
Overall, while fusion may initially seem to be the less complicated approach, the advantages of 
merging the principles are not persuasive. 
A Is Legislation Needed? 
Parliamentary intervention through amendment to the Defamation Act 1992 would perhaps be the 
most effective way to solidify these doctrines. Legislating could also have symbolic effect, in that the 
presence of a legislative bar could be sufficient in itself to deter unworthy claims.146 However, the 
United Kingdom experience with s 1 suggests that legislative change in this area should be done with 
caution, and would arguably be more appropriate in the context of a wide reform of the Defamation 
Act – a discussion which is beyond the scope of this article.147 On balance, legislative change is not 
necessary at this stage. The courts have shown readiness to adopt both doctrines, which are a 
consistent and natural development of the common law. All that is required is clarification. 
Additionally, allowing this area to develop through common law retains flexibility. 
VII  CONCLUSION 
While there is support for both the Thornton threshold and Jameel principle in New Zealand law, 
both will benefit from confirmation and clarification at appellate level. Clarification will reap positive 
outcomes for claimants, defendants and the courts. In order to avoid the difficulties which have 
plagued the United Kingdom, the two doctrines should not be fused. 
  
146  Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd (CA), above n 4, at [78]. 
147  See Ali Romanos "Opinion: England's new defamation legislation sets benchmark" NZ Lawyer Magazine 
(online ed, United Kingdom, 5 Februrary 2014) in which Romanos advocates for wide legislative reform but 
concludes that as this is unlikely to happen in the near future: "the courts should not be inhibited to develop 
New Zealand's defamation law when the opportunity arises." 
